This paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the consumption effects of genetic modification (GM) under alternative labeling regimes and segregation enforcement scenarios. Analytical results show that if consumers perceive GM products as being different than their traditional counterparts, genetic modification affects consumer welfare and, thus, consumption decisions. When the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of cost savings associated with the new technology to consumers, genetic modification results in welfare losses for consumers. The analysis shows that the relative welfare ranking of the "no labeling" and "mandatory labeling" regimes depends on: (i) the level of consumer aversion to genetic modification, (ii) the size of marketing and segregation costs under mandatory labeling; (iii) the share of the GM product to total production; and (iv) the extent to which GM products are incorrectly labeled as non-GM products.
INTRODUCTION
Consumer concern about genetically modified (GM) food is one of the most notable features of agricultural biotechnology. Unlike farmers who have seen agronomic benefits in the new technology and have quickly adopted transgenic plants such as Bt cotton and corn and herbicide-resistant soybeans and canola (Economic Research Service), consumers have expressed reservations about the foods produced from these crops. Consumer opposition to genetic modification started in Europe and has spread to other countries.
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those surveyed favored a ban on GM food. Consumer resistance to genetic modification is founded on health, environmental, moral and philosophical concerns about the "new" practice (Hobbs and Plunkett; Lindner) .
In response to this consumer reaction, a number of food companies such as Marks and Spencer, McDonalds, Sainsbury, and Tesco in the UK, Nestle in Switzerland, Carrefour in France, McCains in Canada, and Frito Lay in the U.S., have indicated that they are only accepting/selling non-GM products. Governments in the European Union and elsewhere have also responded by introducing mandatory labeling or by banning specific GM products (i.e. GM corn and canola in Austria, France, Greece, and
Luxembourg) (Hobbs and Plunkett; Runge and Jackson). A requirement of the Biosafety
Protocol signed by 130 countries in Montreal earlier this year is that shipments of food products that may contain GMOs are to be labeled as such.
While labeling of food products satisfies consumer demand for the right to make informed consumption decisions (Caswell and Mojduszka; Caswell) , the introduction of segregation and labeling raises a number of issues that affect everyone in the food chain.
One issue is the added costs that segregation and labeling introduce and the economic impact of these costs on consumers. A second issue is that segregation and labeling activities create incentives for the misrepresentation and mislabeling of genetically modified food as traditional food. Although there is a growing literature on the nature and origin of consumer attitudes towards GM products, most of the analysis on the economic consequences of these attitudes is rather heuristic in nature. An exception is the paper by Plunkett and Gaisford who examine the welfare effects of introducing GM products, but do not consider consumer heterogeneity or examine the possibility of mislabeling.
The objective of this paper is to develop a conceptual model that examines the consumption effects of genetic modification under alternative labeling regimes and segregation enforcement scenarios. More specifically, the paper analyzes the effect of genetically modified foods on the welfare and purchasing decisions of consumers under:
(i) no labeling; (ii) mandatory labeling under full compliance; (iii) and mandatory labeling when misrepresentation of the type of the product (i.e. mislabeling) occurs.
In analyzing the consumption effects of genetic modification, this paper explicitly accounts for consumer heterogeneity. To capture the different attitudes towards genetic modification, consumers are postulated to differ in the utility they derive from the consumption of GM food and therefore in their willingness to pay for this product.
Consumer heterogeneity is critical in understanding how a demand for both GM and non-GM products exists when labeling occurs.
In this paper, the term genetically modified products refers to transgenics -the products in which some form of gene "splicing" has occurred. The new technology is assumed to generate production cost savings while having no effect on product characteristics that are observable by consumers; the analysis thus applies to goods that are credence in nature.
The title of the paper stems from the major result of the analysis, namely that if consumers perceive GM food to be different from its non-GM counterpart, then there is a reasonable expectation that a percentage of consumers will correctly believe that the introduction of GM food lowers their utility and would prefer to see the product banned.
The key factors that determine the magnitude of this welfare loss are the degree of aversion to GM foods, the degree to which the cost savings at the farm level are not passed through to consumers, and the magnitude of the costs associated with segregating non-GM products from GM products. Although this group would like to ban GM products, when faced with the introduction of GM products as a given, this group will prefer mandatory labeling to no labeling.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual model of the paper. Sections 3, 4, and 5 examine the effect of genetic modification on consumer decisions and welfare under no labeling, mandatory labeling with full compliance, and mandatory labeling with mislabeling, respectively. Section 6 compares and contrasts the no labeling and the mandatory labeling regimes while Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS AND BEHAVIOR
The rise of consumer concerns over GM products and the diversity of these concerns suggests that consumers differ in their willingness to pay for GM versus non-GM food products. In the simplest case consider a consumer that consumes one unit of either a traditional, a GM, or a substitute product. Assuming that the consumer spends a small fraction of total expenditure on the goods in question, her utility function can be written as:
If a unit of a substitute product is consumed where t U is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the traditional product, gm U is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the GM version of the traditional product, and s U is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of a substitute product.
1
The price of the traditional product is t p , the price of its GM counterpart is gm p , and the price of the substitute product is s p . The parameter U is a per unit base level of utility while the term ëc gives the discount in utility from consuming GM product. 1 One example of a product that could be supplied in both a traditional and a GM form is margarine made from canola. In this case, butter can be thought of as a substitute product. A second example could be corn chips (made from traditional or GM corn); the substitute product is potato chips. Other examples of traditional, GM, and substitute products include meat coming from animals fed with (traditional or GM) corn or soybean versus meat coming from animals that are barley fed. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the substitute product (butter, potato chips and meat coming from barley fed animals in the preceding examples) is free of GM ingredients. The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed below in footnote 5.
2 U can also be interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay (wtp) for a unit of the traditional or the substitute product. In such a case, consumer maximum wtp for the GM product equals U-λc. The difference between the wtp and the price of the (traditional, the GM, or the substitute) product provides then an estimate of the relevant consumer surplus.
Differentiating Consumer Attribute (c)
Consumer Utility Figure 1 illustrates the situation where no GM product has been introduced. By assumption, the net utility associated with the traditional good is greater than that associated with the substitute good, i.e.,
, for all consumers. In such a case, all consumers purchase the traditional good and total consumer welfare is given by the shaded area in Figure 1 . The effect of introducing GM products into the market is examined in the sections below.
Figure 1 Consumer Decisions and Welfare Prior to the Introduction of GM Food

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR WHEN GM PRODUCTS ARE NOT LABELED
Consider first the situation where a GM product is introduced, but no labeling of the product is carried out. Because the GM product and its traditional counterpart are marketed together, the price faced by the consumer, nl p , is the same regardless of which product is purchased. The lack of information about the type of the product being sold means that consumers are uncertain as to the nature of the product they purchase. Since the presence or absence of the genetic modification is not detectable with either search or experience, the genetic modification can be referred to as a credence characteristic (Nelson) . Assuming a probability of ø that the non-labeled product purchased is GM, consumer utility is now:
if a unit of a substitute product is consumed where nl U is the expected per unit utility associated with purchasing the non-labeled
The consumption choice of the individual consumer is determined by the relationship between the utilities derived from the non-labeled product and the substitute.
More specifically, the consumer with aversion to GM product given by:
is indifferent between consuming a unit of non-labeled product and a unit of the substitute-the utility associated with the consumption of these offerings is the same.
Obviously, consumers with a lower aversion to genetic modification (i.e. consumers with The focus of the analysis on individuals that were consumers of the product prior to its genetic modification guarantees the positive sign of * nl c . More specifically, for consumers to prefer the product prior to its genetic modification it should hold that
where p t represents the price of the product before genetic engineering. Due to the cost savings associated with the new technology, the price of the non-labeled product p nl will be less than, or equal to, p t . ).
The effect of genetic modification on consumer welfare depends largely on the effect of the technology introduction on the market price of the non-labeled product. The effect of genetic modification on the final price of the product determines whether there will be any gains for consumers as well as the extent of losses due to consumer aversion to GM technology.
More specifically, if the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the food chain prevents the transfer of the cost savings to the consumers, the price seen by consumers is not affected by genetic modification. As was noted above, Figure 2 is constructed on the assumption that the price of the non-labeled product remains unchanged, i.e. If the production costs savings due to genetic modification are transferred to consumers (i.e., in the case of a perfectly competitive food chain), the GM technology reduces the price of the product relative to the price prior to genetic modification, , p t and consumers with relatively low levels of GM aversion will realize an increase in their welfare. Consumers with relatively high aversion to GM products experience a reduction in their welfare since the price effect of genetic modification is outweighed by the utility discount from GM consumption. Overall, the results of this section show that genetic modification and no labeling may result in some consumption switching to the substitute good and a net welfare loss.
If the number of consumers experiencing a welfare loss is substantial, a ban could be both rational and welfare improving. For net consumer losses to be realized it must hold that:
(i) the price decrease from genetic modification (if any) is relatively small; (ii) the discount in utility from consuming the GM product is high; (iii) the likelihood that the non-labeled product is genetically modified is high; and/or (iv) consumers are concentrated at the right hand edge of the aversion spectrum.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR WITH MANDATORY LABELING AND FULL
COMPLIANCE
Consider now the consumer choice problem in an institutional arrangement with a mandatory labeling regime in place. In this case, traditional (non-GM) and GM products are segregated and marketed separately. Consumers now have a choice between a non-GM labeled product, its GM labeled counterpart, and a substitute product. Consumer utility is given by:
if a unit of non-GM labeled product is consumed The GM product and the non-GM product are not necessarily priced the same. In fact for any (positive) quantity of the GM labeled product to be demanded (i.e. for gm U to exceed ' t U ), p gm should be less than ' t p . There are two reasons why the GM product will be priced lower than its traditional counterpart. First, mandatory labeling means increased marketing and segregation costs. These transaction costs associated with identity preservation cause consumer price to rise. The majority of these costs are incurred in the non-GM labeled product chain (Lindner) , which, in turn, implies that consumers of the traditional product face a greater price increase. 6 Second, it is assumed that GM technology generates production cost savings at the farm level. Some, if not all, of the cost savings may be transferred to the consumer of the GM product.
Not only does the existence of marketing and segregation costs imply that
, the size of these costs significantly affects the consumption shares of the products being examined. More specifically, the greater are the marketing and segregation costs, the greater is the price increase of the non-GM labeled product (relative to the price of the product prior to genetic modification, t p ), and the lower is the utility associated with the unit consumption of the non-GM labeled product, ' t U . For 6 The segregation costs are higher for producers of the traditional product due to the effort required in preserving the identity of their produce by keeping it separate from the (inferior regarded) genetically modified one. relatively high marketing and segregation costs, the utility from consuming the non-GM labeled product might fall below the utility associated with the consumption of the substitute (i.e.
). In such a case, consumers with a relatively high aversion to GM products will switch to the substitute product -there is no market demand for the traditional (non-GM) product. The welfare effects of genetic modification under mandatory labeling clearly depend on the effect of GM technology on the price of the GM product. More specifically, if the price of the GM product is less than the price of the product prior to its genetic modification (i.e. if p gm < t p ) consumers with relatively low aversion to genetic modification will gain from the new technology. Consumers with relatively high aversion to GM product experience a reduction in their welfare due to: (i) the utility discount from GM consumption; and (ii) the price increase of the traditional product caused by the marketing and segregation costs. Note that for p gm to be reduced relative to p t , two conditions should be met. First, the market structure must be such that production costs savings from the GM technology are transferred to consumers and, second, the price effect of the reduced production costs should outweigh the effect of increased transaction costs associated with mandatory labeling on the market price of the GM product. More specifically, the greater is the price reduction from genetic modification, the greater is the upward shift of the gm U curve, the greater are the consumer gains and the lower is the welfare loss from the new technology. Similarly, the lower is λ, the greater is the slope of the gm U curve, the greater are the gains and the lower are the consumer losses from genetic modification. Finally, the greater are the marketing and segregation costs incurred in the non-GM product chain, the greater is the downward shift of the ). Compared to the case where mislabeling does not occur, mislabeling reduces both consumer welfare (shaded area in Figure 6 ) and the consumption share of greater is the probability è that the non-GM label is false and/or the greater is the utility discount from the consumption of GM products, ë, the greater are the welfare losses from mislabeling and the greater is the share of non-GM consumers that switches to GM product and the substitute.
In the presence of mislabeling, the consumption share of the GM labeled product, gm s , equals c 1 , the share of the non-GM labeled product, t s , equals c 2 -c 1 , while 1-c 2 percent of consumption moves to the substitute. Mathematically, the consumption shares can be written as:
When the marketing and segregation costs are relatively high (i.e. when
), then mislabeling-as opposed to full compliance-has no effect on either the welfare or the consumption decisions of consumers since in this case no traditional (non-GM) product is consumed (see Figure 5 ).
NO LABELING VERSUS MANDATORY LABELING
After having analyzed the consumption effects of genetic modification under the "no labeling" and the "mandatory labeling" regimes, the question that naturally arises is which labeling regime dominates in terms of its effect on consumer welfare. Or, put in a different way, since the introduction of GM products can result in net welfare losses under both the "no labeling" and the "mandatory labeling" regimes, what is the labeling regime that harms consumers the least?
The determination of the factors affecting the relative performance of the two labeling regimes is straightforward. Figure 7 shows the effective utility curves under no labeling (dashed kinked curve) and mandatory labeling under full compliance when the The shaded area NL reflects consumer utility under the no labeling regime that is lost when mandatory labeling is introduced. Similarly, the area ML represents consumer utility that is lost from a switch from mandatory labeling to no labeling. Obviously, consumers located to the right of c + will favor mandatory labeling, while for consumers located to the left of c + no labeling is the preferred labeling regime. The ranking of the labeling regimes in terms of their net effect on consumer welfare depends on the relative size of the shaded areas in Figure 7 ; if NL is greater than ML, then no labeling is the superior labeling regime. Obviously, when the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers is relaxed, the welfare ranking of the two labeling regimes is affected by the skewness of the distribution. In general, the greater is the number of consumers that are characterized by a relatively high aversion to GM products (i.e. the more skewed towards one is the distribution of consumers with respect to their value of c), the greater is the likelihood that mandatory labeling is the preferred labeling regime.
Comparative statics results can easily be derived from Figure 7 . For instance, an increase in the likelihood that the non-labeled product is GM (i.e. an increase in ψ)
) that increases ML and reduces NL. The greater is ψ, the greater is the consumer support for mandatory labeling.
Similarly, an increase in the marketing and segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling will shift the Finally, when the assumption of full compliance is relaxed and the possibility of product misrepresentation is introduced, the mandatory labeling regime becomes even less appealing from the consumers' standpoint; mislabeling increases the likelihood that no labeling is superior in terms of its effects on total consumer welfare. The greater is the probability that mislabeling occurs, the greater are the consumer utility losses under mandatory labeling, and the greater is the likelihood that an all-or-nothing choice among the two labeling regimes in terms of their effect on consumer utility will favor no labeling.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the effects of genetic modification on the welfare and purchasing behavior of consumers. The conclusion of this paper is that if consumers perceive GM foods to be different from their traditional counterparts, then demands for the banning of GM products and GM labeling are rational. For instance, when the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of the cost savings associated with the GM technology to consumers, then the introduction of GM foods will generally result in welfare losses for consumers. This is true no matter the labeling regime that is in place.
Given that GM foods have been introduced into the food system, the analysis also shows that the relative welfare ranking of the "no labeling" and "mandatory labeling" regimes depends on: (i) the level of consumer aversion to genetic modification, (ii) the segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling; (iii) the share of the GM product to total production; and (iv) the extent of mislabeling. More specifically, the greater are segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling, the greater is the likelihood that no labeling is the superior labeling regime. The greater is the likelihood that the non-labeled product is GM, the greater is the likelihood that mandatory labeling will be preferred.
Finally, when the possibility of product mislabeling is introduced into the analysis, the desirability of mandatory labeling by consumers falls. The uncertainty about product characteristics due to mislabeling reduces consumer welfare and drives part of non-GM product consumers out of the market. The lower is the level of trust in the labeling system, the greater is the expectation that mislabeling occurs, the greater are the consumer utility losses under mandatory labeling, and the greater is the likelihood that an all-or-nothing choice among the two labeling regimes in terms of their welfare implications favors no labeling.
The results of this paper can provide an explanation of policy decisions about genetic modification and labeling observed around the world. Relatively low (or zero) consumer aversion to genetic engineering coupled with a reduced price of GM foods and significant segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling could be among the reasons why a "no labeling" policy has been adopted by countries like the United States and Canada. Increasing consumer concerns, however, and the relatively high level of consumer trust in the food safety institutions in both countries could increase the relative efficiency of -and hence the consumer demand for -mandatory labeling.
A relatively high aversion to genetic modification coupled with a lack of a price reduction for GM foods would rationalize mandatory labeling, an outcome seen in various EU countries. However, a high level of distrust of food safety and inspection systems can undermine the value of labeling. This result sheds light on the demand for an outright ban of GM products by some European consumers, since faith in the food inspection system there has been reduced because of food safety scares such as the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy crisis in the British beef industry.
In summary, consumer concerns about GM products can be expected to affect consumption decisions and to influence the public policy response demanded by consumers. These consumption decisions, along with the decisions made by policy makers as to how GM products are introduced into the food system, can have significant impacts on the demand for GM products throughout the food system. These system effects, in turn, will affect the decisions made by farmers as to which crops they grow and decisions by life science companies as to the pricing of the GM technology and the development of new technologies. 
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